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Abstract. Security is a major target for todays information systems
(IS) designers. Security modelling languages exist to reasoning on secu-
rity in the early phases of IS development, when the most crucial design
decisions are made. Reasoning on security involves analysing risk, and
effectively communicating risk-related information. However, we think
that current languages can be improved in this respect. In this paper,
we discuss this issue for Secure Tropos, the language supporting the
eponymous agent-based IS development methodology. We analyse it and
suggest improvements in the light of an existing reference model for IS se-
curity risk management. This allows checking of Secure Tropos concepts
and terminology against those of current risk management standards,
thereby improving the conceptual appropriateness of the language. The
paper follows a running example, called eSAP, located in the healthcare
domain.
Key words: Risk analysis, information systems, security, Secure Tro-
pos, information systems security risk management.
1 Introduction
Information systems (ISs) undoubtedly play an important role in today’s society
and more and more are at the heart of critical infrastructures. ISs are also facing
an increasing complexity because of their interoperability with other systems
and of their operation in open, distributed and mobile environments. In such
contexts, secure issues are vital and are still reinforced in many sectors with
the introduction of new regulations like Basel II [1] or SOX [2]. Risk manage-
ment is considered as central by IS professionals. These activities do not only
support security officers in the handling of security vulnerabilities but they also
provide a framework in terms of which the return on investment of the secu-
rity solutions are evaluated against the economic and business consequences of
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not implementing them. Today exists more than 200 risk management methods
with the challenge to select the most adequate approach. Through our analy-
sis [3] [4] we have identified some important points for possible improvements.
Firstly, elements are related to the nature of the artefacts produced with such
methods. These artefacts are largely informal and typically consist of natural
language documents, complemented with tables and ad hoc diagrams for struc-
turing the information. The powerful abstraction mechanisms and visualisations
offered by conceptual modelling techniques are thus underexploited. Secondly, a
drawback of methods is that they are often designed for being used to assess the
way existing systems handle risk in an auditing mode. This view is no longer
sustainable in the context of todays ISs that need to constantly adapt to new
environments and handle evolution with minimum human intervention. This is
an additional argument for the use of more formal languages supporting the
reasoning, evolution, monitoring and traceability of risk related information.
In this paper we report on a research related to the design of a suitable
modelling language for supporting security risk management (SRM) activities.
Central in this research is to first achieve a deep understanding of the SRM
domain, then to design an adequate language with suitable constructs and asso-
ciated semantics for that domain. A central focus of risk management methods
is to consider security issues from the very early phases, a.k.a. requirements en-
gineering (RE), of ISs development. The associated scientific literature features
a number of modelling languages specifically dedicated to security sensitive con-
texts; however the risk concepts are only partially supported. This advocates
for the design of ‘yet another’ modelling language. However, defining a complete
new notation does not appear to us as viable option from a sustainability per-
spective for the modelling community. As demonstrated for example with UML
in software engineering, a consensus over unified and common notations has
been proved to be a big push for the adoption of modelling practices in public
and private companies. At RE level we plead for a similar approach and rather
than the development of a totally new language we improve existing languages,
offering an ontological basis sufficiently closed to the risk management domain.
With respect to the above objective, we have identified Secure Tropos [5],
which uses the concept of security constraint and methods such as security attack
scenarios to analyse security requirements, as a suitable candidate language. The
selection of Secure Tropos results from a detailed analysis of the adequacy of its
concepts to the information system security risk management (ISSRM) reference
model [3] [4]. This reference model defines the fundamental concepts of ISSRM
as gathered from a quantity of standards and other sources, e.g., [6] [7] [8]. The
overall approach is illustrated throughout this paper reusing the example of the
electronic Single Assessment Process (eSAP) [9].
The structure of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 we provide theoretical
background for our research. In Section 3 we outline our research method and
apply Secure Tropos in the running example. In Section 4 we describe how
Secure Tropos is aligned with the concepts of the ISSRM reference model. Finally
Section 5 discusses the findings and presents conclusions of the study.
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2 Theory
In this section we introduce the security risk management domain concepts, then
some candidate supporting security modelling languages.
2.1 Security Risk Domain
The ISSRM Reference model [3] [4] presented in Fig. 1 results from a consol-
idation of existing security standards, e.g., [6], [7], [8]. Like the Tropos Goal-Risk
framework [10], the ISSRM reference model addresses risk management at three
different levels, combining together asset, risk, and risk treatment views. How-
ever the ISSRM reference model focuses on the IS security perspective while
the Tropos Goal-Risk framework supports risk in general. In this section we
summarise some core definitions of ISSRM concepts; for more details see [4].
Fig. 1. The ISSRM Reference Model [3] [4]
Asset-related concepts describe what assets are important to protect, and
what criteria guarantee asset security. An asset is anything that has value to
the organisation and is necessary for achieving its objectives. A business asset
describes information, processes, capabilities and skills inherent to the business
and core mission of the organisation, and that has value for it. An IS asset is
a component of the IS supporting business assets like e.g. a database where is
stored medical information of patients. Security criterion characterises a prop-
erty or constraint on business assets describing their security needs. They are
often confidentiality, integrity and availability, but sometimes, depending on the
context, other specific criteria might be added, like non-repudiation or account-
ability.
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Risk-related concepts present how the risk itself is defined. A risk is the com-
bination of a threat with one or more vulnerabilities leading to a negative impact
harming the assets. An impact describes the potential negative consequence of a
risk that may harm assets of a system or an organisation, when a threat (or the
cause of a risk) is accomplished. The cause of the risk is the combination of a
threat and one or more vulnerabilities. A vulnerability describes a characteristic
of an IS asset or group of IS assets that can constitute a weakness or a flaw in
terms of IS security. A threat characterises a potential attack or incident, which
targets one or more IS assets that may lead to harm the assets. A threat agent
is an agent that can potentially cause harm to IS assets. An attack method is a
standard means by which a threat agent carries out a threat.
Risk treatment-related concepts describe what decisions, requirements and
controls should be defined and implemented in order to mitigate possible risks.
A risk treatment is a decision of the intention to treat identified risks. A security
requirement is the refinement of a treatment decision to mitigate the risk. Con-
trols (countermeasures or safeguards) are means designed to improve security,
specified by a security requirement, and implemented to comply with it.
Security risk management process. The ISSRM activities follow the
general risk management process described in traditional risk management stan-
dards, e.g., [6], [7], [8]. It can be summarised into six steps. Here we just briefly
recall each step. For more details see [4]. The process begins with a (a) definition
of the organisation’s context and the identification of its assets. Next one needs to
determine the (b) security objectives, such as confidentiality, integrity and avail-
ability, based on the level of protection required for the assets. During (c) risk
assessment one elicits which risks are harming assets and threatening security
objectives. Once risk assessment is performed, decisions about (d) risk treatment
are taken. Decisions might include risk avoidance, risk reduction, risk transfer
and risk retention. Security requirements (e) on the IS can thus be determined as
security solutions to mitigate the risks. Requirements are instantiated into (f )
security controls, i.e. system specific countermeasures, which are implemented
within the organisation. Finally it should be noted that the risk management
process is iterative. After determination of the security controls new risks that
overcome or are not addressed by these security controls, can emerge.
2.2 Security Modelling Languages
At different IS development phase, security can be addressed using various mod-
elling languages. Abuse frames [11] suggests means to consider security during
the early RE. Abuse cases [12], misuse cases [13], and mal-activity diagrams
[14] address security concerns through negative scenarios executed by system
attacker. SecureUML [15] and UMLsec [16] consider security at system design.
Goal modelling languages have also been adapted to security. Secure i* [17]
addresses security trade-offs during early requirements. KAOS [18] was aug-
mented with so-called anti-goal models designed to elicit rationales of attackers.
In [19] [20] Tropos has been extended with the notions of ownership, permision
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and trust. In this paper we investigate Secure Tropos [5] [21] [22] that models
security using security constraints and attack methods.
All these languages are candidate for supporting largely or partially the SRM
activities. For the purpose of this paper we have chosen Secure Tropos that
incrementally introduces security concerns through the IS development cycle.
The final analysis of the security takes place only during the late development
phases – during design [22]. In this paper we address this problem by using the
ISSRM reference model to improve the language with SRM aspects.
2.3 Secure Tropos
Secure Tropos enriches a set of Tropos [23] [24] constructs (actor, goal, softgoal,
plan, resource, threat, and belief ) with security constructs such as security con-
straint, and threat. An actor (see Fig. 3) describes an entity that has strategic
goals and intentions within the system or within the organisation settings [23].
A hardgoal or simply goal hereafter (see Fig. 3), represents an actors’ strategic
interests. A softgoal (see Fig. 5) unlike a goal, does not have clear criteria for
deciding whether it is satisfied or not and therefore it is subject to interpreta-
tion (goals are said to be satisfied while softgoals are said to be satisficed). A
plan(see Fig. 4) represents a way of doing things. A resource (see Fig. 3) rep-
resents an informational or physical entity. A belief (see Fig. 7) is the actor’s
knowledge of the world. All these constructs are present in both Tropos [23] [24]
and Secure Tropos [9], [21], [22]. In addition Secure TROPOS introduces Security
constraint and Threat. A security constraint represents a restriction related to
security that the system must have and actors must respect (see Fig. 3) [5] [21].
A threat (see Fig. 6) “represents circumstances that have the potential to cause
loss or problems that can put in danger the security features of the system” [5].
Constructs are combined together using relationships: dependency, decom-
position, means-ends, contribution, restricts and attacks; so separating between
actor and goal models. In the actor model one represents the network of relation-
ships between actors. The relationships are captured using the dependency links.
Dependency between two actors indicates that one actor (the depender) depends
for some reason (dependum) on another actor (the dependee) in order to achieve
a goal, to execute a plan, or to deliver a resource [23]. Secure dependency intro-
duces security constraint(s) that must be respected by actors for the dependency
to be satisfied [25]. This means that “the depender expects from the dependee
to satisfy the security constraint(s) and also that the dependee will make effort
to deliver the dependum by satisfying the security constraint(s)” [21]. The goal
model allows a deeper understanding of actors’ reasoning about goals to be ful-
filled, plans to be performed and available resources [24]. The goal model uses
the means-ends, decomposition and contribution relationships. The means-ends
relationship (see Fig. 4) permits to link a means (plan/goal/resource) with a
end (goal). The decomposition relationship (see Fig. 4) permits to define a finer
structure of a plan. Only a plan can be decomposed into goals, softgoals, re-
sources and (sub)plans. A contribution link (see Fig. 5) describes a positive or
negative impact that one element has on another. To facilitate security analysis
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Secure Tropos introduces restricts and attacks. The restricts relationship (see
Fig. 3) describes how goal achievement is restricted by security constraints. The
attacks link (see Fig. 7) shows what is the target of an attacker’s plan.
3 Research Method
3.1 Method for Aligning Secure Tropos and ISSRM
In order to align Secure TROPOS with the ISSRM reference model, the method
shown in Fig. 2 is applied. Our approach is based on the definition of the Secure
Tropos language as it is derived from the Secure Tropos meta-model and the
description of the language in the literature [9] [5] [21] [22] [25].
Fig. 2. Research Method
In this paper we use a running example to explain our analysis towards the
alignment of the Secure Tropos and ISSRM. The running example is initially
used to illustrate the use of the language to address the security risks during
early IS development. We then consider the concepts of Secure Tropos wrt on
how they were used to address ISSRM. The outcome of the comparison is the
concept alignment between the language and the ISSRM reference model. We
document the final results of our alignment artefacts in Fig. 9. At the same time,
an “ISSRM-oriented” Secure TROPOS meta-model is produced. By “ISSRM-
oriented”, we mean a meta-model1 aligned on the ISSRM reference model and
thus showing only concepts and relationships semantically equivalent to those of
the ISSRM reference model.
3.2 Running example
To demonstrate the applicability of our work in a practical and realistic envi-
ronment we employ the electronic Single Assessment Process (eSAP) [26]. The
1 In the paper due to the space requirements we do not include Secure Tropos meta-
model and ISSRM-oriented Secure Tropos meta-model.
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running example is suitable to demonstrate our work for two main reasons: (i)
security and risk are two important factors in the development and implemen-
tation of an electronic system to support the Single Assessment Process; (ii)
security of the system have been successfully analysed using the Secure Tropos
methodology [27]. Therefore, by revisiting the running example, we are able to
identify the exact contributions of this paper. eSAP is an IS to support inte-
grated assessment of the health and social care needs of elderly and it is based
on the Single Assessment Process, which is part of the National Service Frame-
work (NSF) for Older People Services of the English Department of Health.
Due to space limitations, we focus for our running example on one of the most
important aspects to make the eSAP running: the Patient personal information.
Fig. 3. Actor model
(a) Context and Asset Identification. A Social Worker is in charge of
the health care to patients. In order to fulfil her work, she needs the Patient
personal information. In Fig. 3 the Social Worker depends on a goal Collected
care information held by the eSAP system. As the Patient personal information
is a valuable business asset, achievement of the goal Collected care information
is restricted by a security constraint Share info only if consent obtained assuring
that the consent has to be obtained before the personal information can be sent.
The goal Collected care information can be achieved by executing the plan Collect
info about treatment, which needs to gather the Patient personal information and
to perform the Manage care plan.
(b) Security objective determination. The plan Check data for consent
contributes positively to the security constraint Share info only if consent obtained
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Fig. 4. Analysis of ”Obtain care information”
(Fig. 5). This plan is the means to achieve the goal Consent has been obtained. In
our example we strive for privacy of the Patient personal information, thus the goal
Consent has been obtained takes part in the decomposition of the plan Perform
authorisation checks. The latter plan is the means to a goal System privacy ensured
and contributes positively to a security constraint Keep system data privacy.
(c) Risk analysis and assessment. Fig. 6 focuses on a possible cause of
the risk to which the eSAP could be exposed. We identify the Authentication at-
tack (which in Secure Tropos is modelled using the threat construct). It describes
a situation where a threat agent passes himself off as a trusted actor in order to
fake identity and to damage the business assets (e.g., Patient personal informa-
tion). The Authentication attack has a negative impact on the Privacy softgoal.
The constraint Keep system data privacy has a positive impact on the privacy
of the system and can make the possible risk difficult to realise. Note that the
Authentication attack is not placed as an internal concept. The cause of risk does
not depend on the existence of the actor whose assets the risk threatens.
In Fig. 7 we present the view of an Attacker whose aim is to get the Patient
personal information. The Attacker has a threat that is characterised by the goal
Info about patient received and plan Collect info about breaking the system. Plan
is decomposed into two parts: i) the attacker has to get information about the
consent for the Patient personal information; and ii) he needs to find the authen-
tication code to the information. To get the consent, the attacker can Steal data
from a social worker or Buy data from the untrusted social worker. In the example
the belief Possible to check eSAP access repeatedly corresponds to a vulnerabil-
ity, known by the attacker, for the eSAP system. The vulnerability contributes
positively to the decomposition between two plans Collect info about breaking the
system and Check eSAP access repeatedly. The entire Fig. 7 can be seen as the
refinement of the cause of the risk identified in Fig. 6.
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Fig. 5. Constraint for information sharing
Fig. 6. Identification of an authentication risk
(d) Risk treatment. Several risk treatment decisions are suggested in [28].
In the example we apply goal/plan substitution, meaning that we choose different
goals to be fulfilled and plans to be executed to mitigate the risk. This produces
different system design but allows avoiding the Authentication attack.
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Fig. 7. Potential attack scenario
(e) Security requirements definition. Next step is the elicitation of the
countermeasures that help to mitigate the actual risk. With respect to Fig. 5,
we try to find an alternative means to achieve the goal System privacy ensured.
Our solution is to Perform cryptographic procedures (Fig. 8). To fulfill the coun-
termeasure, Encrypt data and Decrypt data are performed at the certain time
moment. Our countermeasure avoids the Authentication attack because now the
eSAP system is designed in a way that it does not require the authentication in-
formation. However this might bring other causes of the risk (e.g., Cryptographic
attack) which need to be again analysed iteratively.
(f ) Control selection and implementation. Control selection can be
reasoned using softgoals distinguishing between different design alternatives. The
step takes place after defining controls following the security requirements.
4 Contribution
Our analysis contributes with the semantic alignment between ISSRM and Se-
cure Tropos. In the example we illustrate how we can use the Secure Tropos
approach to analyse possible attack scenarios and how from attack scenarios
we can withdraw countermeasures. We summarise the discussion on alignment
in Fig. 9. First two columns list the concepts of the ISSRM reference model,
the third column provides synonyms of the ISSRM concepts found in the Se-
cure Tropos literature [21] [9] [5] [25] [22]. The fourth column list the Secure
TROPOS constructs used to address the ISSRM concepts, the last column pro-
vides illustration of the Secure TROPOS concept used in the running example
in Section 3.2.
Asset-related concepts describe what assets are important to protect, and
what criteria guarantee asset security [3]. In Secure TROPOS we identify that
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Fig. 8. Analysis of a countermeasure
Fig. 9. Alignment between the ISSRM reference model and Secure Tropos. * – litera-
ture includes [9] [5] [25] [22]; ** – look for discussion about belief in section 4
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actor, goal, resource and plan constructs (and appropriate relationships among
them) are used to model both business and IS assets. For instance, on the one
hand actors Patient and Social worker (see Fig. 3), goals Obtain care information
and Info provided and plans Collect info about treatment and Manage care plan
(see Fig. 4) describe the process necessary for organisation (health care centre)
to achieve its objective. On the other hand resource Patient personal information
characterises the valuable information. All the mentioned examples are identified
as business assets with respect to the ISSRM reference model [3]. The business
processes and information management are supported by the IS, which in our
example corresponds to eSAP. In more detail (see Fig. 5) the support for the
business assets is described by goals System privacy ensured and Consent has been
obtained and plans Perform authorisation check, Check authentication and Check
data for consent. The concepts which describe how a component or part of the
IS is necessary in supporting business assets, are called IS assets.
The ISSRM security criteria are properties or constraints on business assets
characterising their security needs [3]. In Secure Tropos softgoals (e.g. Privacy)
can help identify higher level security criteria, like privacy, integrity and avail-
ability. Depending on the context it might be necessary to specify other security
criteria, like we do using security constraints Share info only if consent obtained
and Keep system data privacy (see Fig. 5).
Risk-related concepts present how the risk itself is defined, what are the
major principles that should be taken in account when defining the possible risks
[3]. Risk is described by the cause of the risk, corresponding to the Authentication
attack in Fig. 6. The potentional negative consequence of the risk, identified by
a negative contribution link between the Authentication attack and the security
constraint Privacy is called impact of the risk. Here the impact negates the
security criteria and tends to make the business asset not private.
In Fig. 7 a combination of the goal Info about patient received and the plan
Collect info about breaking the system corresponds to the threat describing the
potential attack targeting the business asset Patient personal information. The
threat is triggered by the threat agent Attacker who knows about possibility to
check the eSAP access repeatedly as identified by belief in Fig. 7. To break into
the eSAP system the Attacker carries an attack method consisting of plans Check
eSAP access repeatedly and Steal data from a social worker.
Note that in Fig. 9 belief only partially corresponds to ISSRM vulnerability.
Firstly, the facts that the actor (who has role of attacker), thinks he knows, might
be true – in this case belief will correspond to ISSRM vulnerability. However, it
does not allow lining to a system design solution because this solution might not
exist in the early IS development phase. Secondly, facts known by the attacker
might be wrong; in this case belief will not have correspondence in ISSRM.
Finally, belief does not represent vulnerabilities which exist in the system but is
not known by the attacker.
Risk treatment-related concepts describe what decisions, requirements
and controls should be defined and implemented in order to mitigate possible
risks [3]. According to [18] [28] in our example we select goal/plan substitution
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which allows producing a different eSAP design and thus avoiding the identified
threat. New security requirements (see Fig. 8) that mitigate the risk are identi-
fied as plans Perform cryptographic procedures, Encrypt data, and Decrypt data.
We illustrate the countermeasure only using the Secure Tropos plan construct,
however we must admit that depending on the selected risk treatment decision
the combination of actor, goal, resource and plan might result in the different
security control systems.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we have analysed how Secure Tropos can be applied to analyse
security risks at the early IS development phases. Based on an illustrative ex-
ample, we showed how a Secure Tropos model can be created following security
risk management process. Our purpose was not to develop the complete running
example (for instance we do not detail how plan Check data for consent in Fig. 5
has to be performed), but rather to investigate how different language constructs
can be used to model security risks. We focus on the early phase (early and late
requirements) of the IS development. This means that the analysis of Secure
Tropos is not complete wrt the late development phases, for instance we do not
consider capabilities which are the notion used during IS design.
We know that our research method and results could hold a certain degree of
subjectivity regarding the selection of the Secure TROPOS language’s constructs
at the modelling stage, their application and their comparison with ISSRM. To
deal with the subjectivity within the team we (i) looked at the meta-model of
Secure Tropos and make precise unclear use of language constructs; (ii) collec-
tively agreed about decisions made when creating the running example; (iii)
discussed and reasoned about the Secure Tropos and ISSRM alignment.
The alignment suggests a number of improvements for Secure Tropos to use
it in the context of security risk management activities:
– Secure Tropos has to provide guidelines as to when and how to use the
constructs to avoid misinterpretations of the ISSRM concepts. One of the
improvement is inclusion of the tags into the label of the constructs. For
example, the plan can be used to model business assets, IS assets, threats
and security requirements. Thus, labels such as [BS] could indicate business
assets; [IS]– IS assets; [Th]– threat ; and [Sc]– security requirements. In our
running example we deal with this limitation by decomposing the model
into separate diagrams: we use plan to represent business assets in Fig. 4,
IS assets in Fig. 5, theats in Fig. 7, and security requirements in Fig. 8.
– Secure Tropos could be improved with additional constructs to better cover
the concepts of ISSRM. Fig. 9 indicates that several concepts such as risk,
risk treatment, and control are not reflected in the Secure Tropos approach.
– The semantics of individual modelling constructs should be adapted so that
they adequately represent ISSRM concepts. For example, as discussed, belief
only partially covers vulnerability. A possible improvement is recently sug-
gested in [17] by introducing vulnerable points in the modelled IS. But some
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future research is needed to answer if relationship between vulnerable points
and belief is possible.
Besides Secure Tropos we have also analysed KAOS extension to security
[18] and misuse cases [13]. We envision that after analysing a number of security
languages it will be possible to facilitate model transformation and languages
interoperability. This would allow representing IS using different perspectives,
also ensuring IS sustainability.
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